Introducing "cooperative push": How inefficient environmental policy (sometimes!) protects the global commons better

Public Choice

Volumn 111, Issue 3-4, 2002, Pages 285-302

  Endres, Alfred ^a   Ohl, Cornelia ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HAGEN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0141675975     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1014916012640     Document Type: Article

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