A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 26, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 286-336

  Ray, Debraj ^a,b   Vohra, Rajiv ^c  

^a Boston University   (United States)

^b Barcelona)   (Spain)

^c BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002351655     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1998.0648     Document Type: Article

References (30)

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