Participation in international environmental agreements: The role of timing and regulation

Natural Resource Modeling

Volumn 19, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 165-200

  Finus, Michael ^a   Rundshagen, Bianca ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HAGEN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Coalition theory; International environmental agreements; Role of international regulator; Timing of participation decision

Indexed keywords

EID: 67650227999     PISSN: 08908575     EISSN: 19397445     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1939-7445.2006.tb00179.x     Document Type: Article

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