North-South climate change negotiations: A sequential game with asymmetric information

Public Choice

Volumn 121, Issue 3-4, 2004, Pages 455-480

  Caparros A ^a   Pereau J C ^b   Tazdait T ^c  

^a CSIC Instituto de Economia Geografia y Demografia IEGD   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITÉ GUSTAVE EIFFEL   (France)

^c CNRS   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 15244352594     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-004-2683-x     Document Type: Article

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