An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 54, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 296-310

  Rubio, Santiago J ^a   Ulph, Alistair ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VALENCIA   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Internal and external stability conditions; Self enforcing international environmental agreements; Stock pollutant

Indexed keywords

APPROXIMATION THEORY; COSTS; INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION; POLLUTION;

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL STABILITY CONDITIONS; INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS; STATIC MODELS; STOCK POLLUTANTS;

ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT;

ABATEMENT COST; INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT; MODELING; TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION;

EID: 35548986248     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: 10960449     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2007.02.004     Document Type: Article

References (13)

1. Barrett S. Self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Oxford Econ. Pap. 46 (1994) 878-894
2. Barrett S. Towards a theory of international environmental cooperation. In: Carraro C., and Siniscalco D. (Eds). New Directions in the Economic Theory of the Environment (1997), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 239-280
3. Barrett S. Environment & Statecraft. The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making (2003), Oxford University Press, Oxford
4. Bloch F. Non-cooperative models of coalition formation in games with spillovers. In: Carraro C., and Siniscalco D. (Eds). New Directions in the Economic Theory of the Environment (1997), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 311-352
5. Carraro C., and Siniscalco D. Strategies for the international protection of the environment. J. Public Econ. 52 (1993) 309-328
6. Chander P., and Tulkens H. A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution. Int. Tax Public Finance 2 (1995) 279-293
7. J. Eyckmans, On the farsighted stability of the Kyoto protocol, CLIMNEG Working Paper 40, CORE, Universite Catholique de Louvain, 2001.
8. Finus M. Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation (2001), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, USA
9. Germain M., Toint P., Tulkens H., and de Zeeuw A. Transfers to sustain core-theoretic cooperation in international stock-pollutant control. J. Econ. Dynam. Control 28 (2003) 79-99
10. L. Karp, S. Sachetti, Dynamics and limited cooperation in international environmental agreements, mimeo, University of California, Berkeley, 1997.
11. Petrosjan L., and Zaccour G. Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction. J. Econ. Dynam. Control 27 (2003) 381-398
12. Rubio S., and Casino B. Self-enforcing international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant. Spanish Econ. Rev. 7 (2005) 89-109
13. S. Rubio, A. Ulph, A simple dynamic model of international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant, Discussion Paper in Economics and Econometrics 0209, Department of Economics, University of Southampton, 2002.