Coalitional power and public goods

Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 109, Issue 6, 2001, Pages 1355-1384

  Ray D , Vohra R ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC THEORY; EFFICIENCY MEASUREMENT; PUBLIC GOODS;

EID: 0035680639     PISSN: 00223808     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/323275     Document Type: Article

References (27)

1. On the number and size of nations
2. On the private provision of public goods
3. Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
4. Non-cooperative models of coalition formation in games with spillovers
5. Strategies for the international protection of the environment
6. On cores in economies with public goods
7. The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
8. A non-cooperative theory of coalitional bargaining
9. Farsighted coalitional stability
10. Multipart pricing of public goods
11. The problem of social cost
12. Lindahl's solution and the core of an economy with public goods
13. Incentives in teams
14. Incentives and the allocation of public goods
15. Just taxation - A positive solution
16. Equilibrium binding agreements
17. A theory of endogenous coalition structures
18. The core of a public goods economy
19. The Lindahl solution for economies with public goods
20. External economies and cores
21. Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model
22. The pure theory of public expenditure
23. The economics of incentives: An introductory account
24. Endogenous formation of customs unions under imperfect competition: Open regionalism is good