Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 55, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 163-174

  de Zeeuw, Aart ^a,b  

^a TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Coalitional stability; Dynamics; IEAs

Indexed keywords

DYNAMIC ANALYSIS; DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS; GAME THEORY;

COALITIONAL STABILITY; ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS;

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT;

ABATEMENT COST; COMPARATIVE STUDY; EMISSION CONTROL; ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; GAME THEORY; INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT;

EID: 39149086134     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: 10960449     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2007.06.003     Document Type: Article

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