Consensus treaties

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

Volumn 158, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 529-547

  Barrett, Scott ^a  

^a JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036974686     PISSN: 09324569     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1628/0932456022975169     Document Type: Article

References (22)

1. ARCE M., D. G. [2000], "Leadership and the Aggregation of International Collective Action," Oxford Economic Papers, 53, 114-137.
2. AXELROD, R. [1984], The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books: New York.
3. BARRETT, S. [1992], "International Environmental Agreements as Games," pp. 11-35 in: R. Pethig (ed.), Conflict and Cooperation in Managing Environmental Resources, Springer-Verlag: Berlin.
4. _ [1994], "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, 46, 878-894.
5. _ [1997], "The Strategy of Trade Sanctions in International Environmental Agreements," Resource and Energy Economics, 19, 345-361.
6. _ [1999], "A Theory of Full International Cooperation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, 11, 519-541.
7. _ [2001], "International Cooperation for Sale," European Economic Review, 45, 1835-1850.
8. BENEDICK, R. E. [1998], Ozone Diplomacy, Harvard University: Cambridge, MA.
9. BUCHHOLZ, W., C. HASLBECK, AND T. SANDLER [1998], "When does Partial Co-Operation Pay?" Finanzarchiv, 55, 1-20.
10. CARRARO, C., AND D. SINISCALCO [1993], "Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment," Journal of Public Economics, 52, 309-328.
11. ENDRES, A., AND M. FINUS [1998], "Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria in a Bargaining Game over Global Emission Reductions: Does the Instrumental Framework Matter?" pp. 135-164 in: N. Hanley and H. Folmer (eds.), Game Theory and the Global Environment, Edward Elgar: Cheltenham.
12. FARRELL, J., AND E. MASKIN [1989], "Renegotiation in Repeated Games," Games and Economic Behavior, 1, 327-360.
13. FEHR, E., AND S. GÄCHTER [2000], "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, 90, 980-994.
14. FINUS, M., AND B. RUNDSHAGEN [1998], "Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria in a Global Emission Game When Players are Impatient," Environmental and Resource Economics, 12, 275-306.
15. HEAL, G. [1993], "Formation of International Environmental Agreements," pp. 301-322 in: C. Carraro (ed.), Trade, Innovation, Environment, Kluwer: Dordrecht.
16. HOEL, M. [1992], "International Environment Conventions: The Case of Uniform Reductions of Emissions," Environmental and Resource Economics, 2, 141-159.
17. _ AND K. SCHNEIDER [1997], "Incentives to Participate in an International Environmental Agreement," Environmental and Resource Economics, 9, 153-170.
18. KJELLEN, B. [1994], "A Personal Assessment," pp. 149-174 in: I. M. Mintzer and J. A. Leonard (eds.), Negotiating Climate Change: The Inside Story of the Rio Convention, Cambridge University: Cambridge.
19. OSTROM, E. [1998], "A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action," American Political Science Review, 92, 1-22.
20. RUNGE, C. F. [1984], "Institutions and the Free Rider: The Assurance Problem in Collective Action," Journal of Politics, 46, 154-181.
21. SANDLER, T. [1997], Global Challenges, Cambridge University: Cambridge.
22. VAN DAMME, E. [1989], "Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria in Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, 46, 206-217.