The Oslo Protocol on sulfur reduction: The great leap forward?

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 87, Issue 9-10, 2003, Pages 2031-2048

  Finus, Michael ^a   Tjøtta, Sigve ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HAGEN   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BERGEN   (Norway)

Author keywords

International environmental agreements; Self enforcing and effective treaties; Sulfur reduction

Indexed keywords

EID: 0141760632     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00042-7     Document Type: Article

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