Quotas May Beat Taxes in a Global Emission Game

International Tax and Public Finance

Volumn 9, Issue 6, 2002, Pages 687-707

  Endres, Alfred ^a   Finus, Michael ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HAGEN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Instrumental choice; International environmental agreements

Indexed keywords

EID: 0348245748     PISSN: 09275940     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1020911130175     Document Type: Article

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