Design of international environmental agreements under uncertainty

Environmental Economics and Policy Studies

Volumn 6, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 103-118

  Fujita, Toshiyuki ^a  

^a KYUSHU UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

Cooperative game; Core; Learning; Stability of a coalition; Uncertainty

Indexed keywords

EID: 67650246056     PISSN: 1432847X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF03353933     Document Type: Article

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