Measures to enhance the success of global climate treaties

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics

Volumn 7, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 73-97

  Eyckmans, Johan ^a,b   Finus, Michael ^c  

^a EHSAL   (Belgium)

^b UNIVERSITY OF LEUVEN   (Belgium)

^c UNIVERSITY OF HAGEN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Coalition formation; Design of climate treaty protocol; Integrated assessment model; Non cooperative game theory

Indexed keywords

GLOBAL CLIMATE; GLOBAL WARMING; INSTITUTIONAL REFORM; INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT; MITIGATION;

EID: 33847637132     PISSN: 15679764     EISSN: 15731553     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10784-006-9030-2     Document Type: Article

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