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Volumn 58, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 233-263

Self-enforcing international environmental agreements revisited

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ABATEMENT COST; EMISSION CONTROL; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT; NUMERICAL MODEL; POLICY IMPLEMENTATION;

EID: 33645855227     PISSN: 00307653     EISSN: 14643812     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oep/gpl002     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (98)

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