Taxes versus quotas to limit global environmental risks: New insights into an old affair

Environmental Economics and Policy Studies

Volumn 3, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 399-423

  Endres, Alfred ^a   Ohl, Cornelia ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HAGEN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Emission quotas; Emission taxes; International environmental agreements; International risk management; Prisoners dilemma

Indexed keywords

EID: 84919921483     PISSN: 1432847X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF03354048     Document Type: Article

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