New roads to international environmental agreements: the case of global warming

Environmental Economics and Policy Studies

Volumn 7, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 391-414

  Eyckmans, Johan ^a,c   Finus, Michael ^b,d  

^a EHSAL   (Belgium)

^b UNIVERSITY OF HAGEN   (Germany)

^c UNIVERSITY OF LEUVEN   (Belgium)

^d NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE   (Singapore)

Author keywords

Coalition formation; Design of climate treaty protocol; Noncooperative game theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 55849114474     PISSN: 1432847X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF03353948     Document Type: Article

References (31)

1. Barrett S (1994) Self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Oxford Economic Papers 46:804–878
2. Barrett S (2003) Environment and statecraft—the strategy of environmental treaty-making. Oxford University Press, Oxford
3. Bloch F (1997) Non-cooperative models of coalition formation in games with spillovers. In: Carraro C, Siniscalco D (eds) New directions in the economic theory of the environment. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 311–352
4. Böhringer C (2002) Climate politics from Kyoto to Bonn: from little to nothing? Energy Journal 23:51–71
5. Bosello F, Buchner B, Carraro C, Raggi D (2004) Can equity enhance efficiency? Some lessons from climate negotiations. In: Carraro C, Fragnelli V (eds) Game practice and the environment. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, ch. 2
6. Botteon M, Carraro C (1997) Burden-sharing and coalition stability in environmental negotiations with asymmetric countries. In: Carraro C (ed) International environmental negotiations: strategic policy issues. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp 26–55
7. Buchner B, Carraro C (2003) Emission trading regimes and incentives to participate in international climate agreements. CATEP Policy Brief No. 3, 2003
8. Carraro C (1997) The structure of international environmental agreements. Working Paper, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. Revised version appeared as: The structure of international agreements on climate change. In: Carraro C (ed) International environmental agreements on climate change. Kluwer, Dordrecht, (1999)
9. Carraro C (2000) Roads towards international environmental agreements. In: Siebert H (ed) The economics of international environmental problems. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, pp 169–202
10. Carraro C, Marchiori C (2003) Stable coalitions. In Carraro C (ed) Endogenous formation of economic coalitions. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, pp 156–198
11. Carraro C, Siniscalco D (1993) Strategies for the international protection of the environment. Journal of Public Economics 52:309–328
12. Chander P, Tulkens H (1995) A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution. International Tax and Public Finance 2:279–293
13. Chander P, Tulkens H (1997) The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities. International Journal of Game Theory 26:379–401
14. d’Aspremont C, Jacquemin A, Gabszewicz JJ, Weymark JA (1983) On the stability of collusive price leadership. Canadian Journal of Economics 16:17–25
15. Eyckmans J, Tulkens H (2003) Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problem. Resource and Energy Economics 25:299–327
16. Finus M (2001) Game theory and international environmental cooperation. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham
17. Finus M (2003) Stability and design of international environmental agreements: the case of transboundary pollution. In: Folmer H, Tietenberg T (eds) International yearbook of environmental and resource economics, 2003/04. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, pp 82–158
18. Finus M, Rundshagen B (2003) Endogenous coalition formation in global pollution control. In: Carraro C (ed) Endogenous formation of economic coalitions. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, pp 199–243
19. Finus M, van Ierland E, Dellink R (2003) Stability of climate coalitions in a cartel formation game. Working Paper No. 60.2003, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milano, forthcoming in Economics of Governance
20. Hoel M (1992) International environment conventions: the case of uniform reductions of emissions. Environmental and Resource Economics 2:141–159
21. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2001) Climate change 2001: mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
22. 2 emission permits: initial distribution as a justice problem. Environmental Values 4:129–148
23. Nordhaus WD, Yang Z (1996) A regional dynamic general-equilibrium model of alternative climate-change strategies. American Economic Review 86:741–765
24. Ray D, Vohra R (1999) A theory of endogenous coalition structures. Games and Economic Behavior 26:286–336
25. Rose A, Stevens B, Edmonds J, Wise M (1998) International equity and differentiation in global warming policy. Environmental and Resource Economics 12:25–51
26. Rubio S, Ulph A (2003) An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreement. Working Paper 57.03, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milano
27. Rundshagen B (2002) On the formalization of open membership in coalition formation games. Working Paper No. 318, University of Hagen
28. Stevens B, Rose A (2002) A dynamic analysis of the marketable permits approach to global warming policy: a comparison of spatial and temporal flexibility. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 44:45–69
29. Tol R (2001) Climate coalitions in an integrated assessment model. Computational Economics 18:159–172
30. Weitzman ML (2001) Gamma discounting. American Economic Review 91:260–271
31. Yi S-S (1997) Stable coalition structures with externalities. Games and Economic Behavior 20:201–237