Coalition formation in a global warming game: How the design of protocols affects the success of environmental treaty-making

Natural Resource Modeling

Volumn 19, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 323-358

  Eyckmans, Johan ^a   Finus, Michael ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEUVEN   (Belgium)

^b UNIVERSITY OF HAGEN   (Germany)

^c NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE   (Singapore)

Author keywords

Coalition formation; Design of climate treaty protocol; Noncooperative game theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645886584     PISSN: 08908575     EISSN: 19397445     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1939-7445.2006.tb00184.x     Document Type: Article

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