Comparing open and sealed bid auctions: Evidence from online labor markets

Information Systems Research

Volumn 27, Issue 1, 2016, Pages 49-69

  Hong, Yili ^a   Wang, Chong ^b   Pavlou, Paul A ^c  

^a ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CITY UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

^c TEMPLE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Auction format; Auction performance; Auction theory; Buyer surplus; Competition uncertainty; Online labor markets; Open bids; Sealed bids; Valuation uncertainty

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION; EMPLOYMENT; SALES; UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS;

AUCTION FORMAT; AUCTION PERFORMANCE; AUCTION THEORY; BUYER SURPLUS; LABOR MARKETS; OPEN BIDS; SEALED BIDS;

COMMERCE;

EID: 84962877714     PISSN: 10477047     EISSN: 15265536     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/isre.2015.0606     Document Type: Article

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