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Volumn 67, Issue 5, 1999, Pages 1219-1238

Common value auctions with insider information

(2)  Kagel, John H a   Levin, Dan a  

a NONE

Author keywords

Asymmetric information structure; Common value auctions; Learning; Winner's curse

Indexed keywords


EID: 0001484747     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00074     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (57)

References (13)
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  • 2
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  • 4
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    • Cason, T.N.1    Friedman, D.2
  • 5
    • 0031319725 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Adaptive learning vs. equilibrium refinements in an entry limit pricing game
    • COOPER, DAVID J., SUSAN GARVIN, AND JOHN H. KAGEL (1997): "Adaptive Learning vs. Equilibrium Refinements in an Entry Limit Pricing Game," RAND Journal of Economics, 28, 662-683.
    • (1997) RAND Journal of Economics , vol.28 , pp. 662-683
    • Cooper, D.J.1    Garvin, S.2    Kagel, J.H.3
  • 6
    • 0001522342 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • A comparison of naive and experienced bidders in common value offer auctions: A laboratory analysis
    • DYER, DOUGLAS, JOHN H. KAGEL, AND DAN LEVIN (1998): "A Comparison of Naive and Experienced Bidders in Common Value Offer Auctions: A Laboratory Analysis," Economic Journal, 99, 108-115.
    • (1998) Economic Journal , vol.99 , pp. 108-115
    • Dyer, D.1    Kagel, J.H.2    Levin, D.A.N.3
  • 8
    • 0039054526 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Measuring players losses in experimental games
    • FUDENBERG, DREW, AND DAVID K. LEVINE (1997): "Measuring Players Losses in Experimental Games," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 507-536.
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    • Fudenberg, D.1    Levine, D.K.2
  • 9
  • 10
    • 0003673542 scopus 로고
    • Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall
    • GUENTHER, WILLIAM C. (1964): Analysis of Variance. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
    • (1964) Analysis of Variance
    • Guenther, W.C.1
  • 11
    • 0010709253 scopus 로고
    • An asymmetric common value auction model
    • HAUSCH, DONALD B. (1987): "An Asymmetric Common Value Auction Model," RAND Journal of Economics, 18, 611-621.
    • (1987) RAND Journal of Economics , vol.18 , pp. 611-621
    • Hausch, D.B.1
  • 12
    • 0142045277 scopus 로고
    • Competitive bidding with asymmetric information
    • WILSON, ROBERT (1967): "Competitive Bidding with Asymmetric Information," Management Science, 13, 816-820.
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    • Wilson, R.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.