Effect of information feedback on bidder behavior in continuous combinatorial auctions

Management Science

Volumn 58, Issue 4, 2012, Pages 811-830

  Adomavicius, Gediminas ^a   Curley, Shawn P ^a   Gupta, Alok ^a   Sanyal, Pallab ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

^b GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Auctions; Bbidder behavior; Combinatorial auctions; Eexperimental economics; Information feedback

Indexed keywords

AUCTIONS; BBIDDER BEHAVIOR; BIDDING STRATEGY; COGNITIVE COMPLEXITY; COMBINATORIAL AUCTION; CONTINUOUS AUCTIONS; DATA-DRIVEN APPROACH; ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY; ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS; INFORMATION FEEDBACK; ONLINE MARKETPLACES; THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT;

CLUSTER ANALYSIS;

COMMERCE;

EID: 84860666321     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1110.1443     Document Type: Article

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