Competitive bidding in auctions with private and common values

Economic Journal

Volumn 113, Issue 489, 2003, Pages 598-613

  Goeree, Jacob K ^a   Offerman, Theo ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

VALUATION;

EID: 0042575709     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.t01-1-00142     Document Type: Article

References (36)

1. Albers, W. and Harstad, R. M. (1991). 'Common-value auctions with independent information: a framing effect observed in a market game', in (R. Selten, ed.), Game Equilibrium Models, vol. 2, Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
2. An, M. Y. (1998). 'Logconcavity versus logconvexity: a complete characterization', Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 80, pp. 350-69.
3. Ashenfelter, O. (1989). 'How auctions work for wine and art', Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 3, pp. 23-6.
4. Athey, S. (2001). 'Single crossing properties and the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in games of incomplete information', Econometrica, vol. 69, pp. 861-90.
5. Bikhchandani, S. and Riley, J. G. (1991). 'Equilibria in open common value auctions', Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 53, pp. 101-30.
6. Bulow, J. I. and Klemperer, P. D. (1996). 'Auctions versus negotiations', American Economic Review, vol. 86, pp. 180-94.
7. Bulow, J. I. and Klemperer, P. D. (2002). 'Prices and the winner's curse', RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 33, pp. 1-21.
8. Bulow, J. I., Huang, M. and Klemperer, P. D. (1999). 'Toeholds and takeovers', Journal of Political Economy, vol. 107, pp. 427-54.
9. Caplin, A. and Nalebuff, B. (1991). 'Aggregation and imperfect competition: on the existence of equilibrium', Econometrica, vol. 59, pp. 25-59.
10. Compte, O. and Jehiel, P. (2002). 'On the value of competition in procurement auctions', Econometrica, vol. 70, pp. 343-55.
11. Dasgupta, P. and Maskin, E. S. (2000). 'Efficient auctions', Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 115, pp. 341-88.
12. Feddersen, T. and Pesendorfer, W. (1997). 'Voting behavior and information aggregation in elections with private information', Econometrica, vol. 65, pp. 1029-58.
13. Goercee, J. K. and Offerman, T. (2002). 'Efficiency in auctions with private and common values: an experimental study', American Economic Review, vol. 92, pp. 625-43.
14. Graham, D. A. and Marshall, R. C. (1987). 'Collusive bidder behavior at single-object second-price and English auctions', Journal of Political Economy, vol. 95, pp. 1217-39.
15. Holt, C. A. (1980). 'Competitive bidding for contracts under alternative auction procedures', Journal of Political Economy, vol. 88, pp. 433-45.
16. Jackson, M. O. (1999). 'The non-existence of equilibrium in auctions with two-dimensional types', working paper, California Institute of Technology.
17. Jehiel, P. and Moldovanu, B. (2001). 'Efficient design with interdependent valuations', Econometrica, vol. 69, pp. 1237-59.
18. Klemperer, P. D. (1998). 'Auctions with almost common values', European Economic Review, vol. 42, pp. 757-69.
19. Klemperer, P. D. (1999). 'Auction theory: a guide to the literature', Journal of Economic Surveys, vol. 13, pp. 227-86.
20. Klemperer, P. D. (2000). 'Why every economist should learn some auction theory', in (M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen and S. Turnovski, eds.), Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Invited Lectures to Eighth World Congress of the Econometric Society, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.
21. Krishna, V. and Morgan, J. (1997). '(Anti-) competitive effects of joint bidding and bidder restrictions', working paper, Penn State University and Princeton University.
22. Laffont, J.-J. (1997). 'Game theory and empirical economics: the case of auction data', European Economic Review, vol. 41, pp. 1-35.
23. Laffont, J.-J., Ossard, H. and Vuong, Q. (1995). 'Econometrics of first-price auctions', Econometrica, vol. 63, pp. 953-80.
24. Maskin, E. S. (1992). 'Auctions and privatization', in (H. Siebert, ed.), Privatization, Institut fur Weltwirtschaften der Universitat Kiel, pp. 115-36.
25. McAfee, R. P. and McMillan, J. (1987). 'Auctions and bidding', Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 25, pp. 699-738.
26. McAfee, R. P. and McMillan, J. (1992). 'Bidding rings', American Economic Review, vol. 82, pp. 579-99.
27. McMillan, J. (1995). 'Why auction the spectrum?', Telecommunications Policy, vol. 19, pp. 191-99.
28. Milgrom, P. R. (1981). 'Good news and bad news: representation theorems and applications', The Bell Journal of Economics, vol. 12, pp. 380-91.
29. Milgrom, P. R. and Weber, R. J. (1982). 'A theory of auctions and competitive bidding', Econometrica, vol. 50, pp. 1089-121.
30. Paarsch, H. (1992). 'Deciding between the common and private value paradigms in empirical models of auctions', Journal of Econometrics, vol. 51, pp. 191-215.
31. Pesendorfer, W. and Swinkels, J. M. (2000). 'Efficiency and information aggregation in auctions', American Economic Review, vol. 90, pp. 499-525.
32. Robinson, M. S. (1985). 'Collusion and the choice of auction', RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 16, pp. 141-5.
33. Rothkopf, M. H. (1969). 'A model of rational competitive bidding', Management Science, vol. 15, pp. 362-73.
34. Vickrey, W. (1961). 'Counterspeculation, auctions, and sealed tenders', Journal of Finance, vol. 16, pp. 8-37.
35. Wilson, R. (1969). 'Competitive bidding with disparate information', Management Science, vol. 15, pp. 446-8.
36. Wilson, R. (1977). 'A bidding model of perfect competition', Review of Economic Studies, vol. 44, pp. 511-8.