Designing online auctions with past performance information

Decision Support Systems

Volumn 42, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 1307-1320

  Liu, De ^a   Chen, Jianqing ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

Author keywords

Google; Keyword advertising; Multi dimensional values; Search engine; UPC auctions

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER AIDED DESIGN; CONTRACTS; INFORMATION ANALYSIS; OPTIMIZATION; PERFORMANCE; SEARCH ENGINES;

GOOGLE SEARCH ENGINE; KEYWORD ADVERTISING; MULTI DIMENSIONAL VALUES; UNIT PRICE CONTRACT (UPC) AUCTIONS;

ONLINE SYSTEMS;

EID: 33750482601     PISSN: 01679236     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.dss.2005.10.012     Document Type: Article

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