The winner's curse, reserve prices, and endogenous entry: Empirical insights from eBay auctions

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 34, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 329-355

  Bajari, Patrick ^a   Hortaçsu, Ali ^b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042745378     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1593721     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (34)

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