A comparison of buyer-determined and price-based multiattribute mechanisms

Marketing Science

Volumn 26, Issue 5, 2007, Pages 629-641

  Engelbrecht Wiggans, Richard ^a   Haruvy, Ernan ^b   Katok, Elena ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS   (United States)

^c PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Behavioral game theory; Bidding; Experimental economics; Multiattribute auctions; Procurement; Reverse auctions

Indexed keywords

EID: 38549164725     PISSN: 07322399     EISSN: 1526548X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mksc.1070.0281     Document Type: Article

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