Common value auctions with insider information

Common Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 245-269

  Kagel, John H ^a   Levin, Dan ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84890691112     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

References (30)

1. Akerlof, George (1970): "The Market for Lemons: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 89, 488-500.
2. Andreoni, James (1995): "Warm-Glow versus Cold-Prickle: The Effects of Positive and Negative Framing on Cooperation in Experiments," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 1-22.
3. Campbell, Colin, and Dan Levin (1997): "Can the Seller Benefit from an Insider in Common Value Auctions?" Mimeographed, Ohio State University.
4. Cason, Timothy N., and Daniel Friedman (1997): "Price Formation in Single Call Markets," Econometrica, 65, 311-346.
5. Cooper, David J., Susan Garvin, and John H. Kagel (1997): "Adaptive Learning vs. Equilibrium Refinements in an Entry Limit Pricing Game," RAND Journal of Economics, 28, 662-683.
6. Dyer, Douglas, John H. Kagel, and Dan Levin (1998): "A Comparison of Naive and Experienced Bidders in Common Value Offer Auctions: A Laboratory Analysis," Economic Journal, 99, 108-115.
7. Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard, Paul R. Milgrom, and Robert J. Weber (1983). "Competitive Bidding and Proprietary Information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, 11, 161-169.
8. Fudenberg, Drew, and David K. Levine (1997): "Measuring Players Losses in Experimental Games," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 507-536.
9. Garvin, Susan, and Rain H. Kagel (1994): "Learning in Common Value Auctions: Some Initial Observations," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 25, 351-372.
10. Guenther, William C. (1964): Analysis of Variance. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
11. Hausch, Donald B. (1987): "An Asymmetric Common Value Auction Model," RAND Journal of Economics, 18, 611-621.
12. Hendricks, Kenneth, Robert H. Porter, and Charles A. Wilson (1994): "Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price," Econometrica, 62, 1415-1444.
13. Kagel, John H. (1995): "Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research," in The Handbook of Experimental Economics, ed. by J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
14. Kagel, John H., Ronald M. Harstad, and Dan Levin (1987): "Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study," Econometrica, 55, 1275-1304.
15. Kagel, John H., and D. Levin (1986): "The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions," American Economic Review, 76, 894-920.
16. Kagel, John H. (1993): "Independent Private Value Auctions: Bidder Behavior in First-, Second-and Third-Price Auctions with Varying Numbers of Bidders," Economic Journal, 103, 868-880.
17. Kagel, John H. (1998): "Common Value Auctions with Insider Information," Mimeographed, University of Pittsburgh.
18. Kagel, John H., D. Levin, R. Battalio, and D. J. Meyer (1989): "First-Price Common Value Auctions: Bidder Behavior and the Winner's Curse," Economic Inquiry, 27, 241-258.
19. Kagel, John H., D. Levin, and R. M. Harstad (1995): "Comparative Static Effects of Number of Bidders and Public Information in Second-Price Common Value Auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, 24, 293-319.
20. Kagel, John H., and J. F. Richard (1998): "Super-experienced Bidders in First-price Common Value Auction,: Rules-of-thumb, Nash Equilibrium Bidding and the Winner's Curse," Mimeographed, University of Pittsburgh.
21. Laskowski, M. C., and R. L. Slonim (in press): "An Asymmetric Solution for Sealed Bid Common-Value Auctions with Bidders Having Asymmetric Information," Games and Economic Behavior (in press).
22. Levin, D., John H. Kagel, and J. F. Richard (1996): "Revenue Effects and Information Processing in English Common Value Auctions," American Economic Review, 86, 442-460.
23. Lind, B., and C. R. Plott (1991): "The Winner's Curse: Experiments with Buyers and with Sellers," American Economic Review, 81, 335-346.
24. Marshall, Robert C., Michael J. Meurer, Jean-Francois Richard, and Walter Stromquist (1994): "Numerical Analysis of Asymmetric First Price Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, 7, 193-220.
25. Milgrom, Paul R., and Robert J. Weber (1982): "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, 50, 1089-1122.
26. Schotter, A., K. Weigelt, and C. Wilson (1995): "A Laboratory Investigation of Multiperson Rationality and Presentation Effects," Games and Economic Behavior, 8, 164-212.
27. Selten, Reinhard, and Joachim Buchta (1994): "Experimental Sealed Bid First Price Auctions with Directly Observed Bid Functions," Discussion Paper No. B-270, University of Bonn.
28. Weverbergh, M. (1979): "Competitive Bidding with Asymmetric Information Reanalyzed," Management Science, 25, 291-294.
29. Wilson, Robert (1967): "Competitive Bidding with Asymmetric Information," Management Science, 13, 816-820.
30. Wilson, Robert. (1985): "Analytical Foundations of Pricing Strategy-Trading Procedures," Mimeographed, Stanford University.