Effects of information revelation policies under cost uncertainty

Information Systems Research

Volumn 23, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 75-92

  Kannan, Karthik N ^a  

^a PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Auctions; Economics of information systems; Electronic markets; Information revelation; Perfect bayesian nash equilibrium

Indexed keywords

EID: 84865102213     PISSN: 10477047     EISSN: 15265536     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/isre.1100.0292     Document Type: Article

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