Structural models and endogeneity in corporate finance: The link between managerial ownership and corporate performance

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 103, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 149-168

  Coles, Jeffrey L ^a   Lemmon, Michael L ^b   Felix Meschke, J ^c  

^a ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF UTAH   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS   (United States)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Corporate performance; Endogeneity; Executive compensation; Managerial ownership; Structural model

Indexed keywords

EID: 81055156941     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.04.002     Document Type: Article

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