Stock and option grants with performance-based vesting provisions

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 23, Issue 10, 2010, Pages 3849-3888

  Bettis, Carr ^a,b   Bizjak, John ^c   Coles, Jeffrey ^a,b   Kalpathy, Swaminathan ^d  

^a ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Verus Research   (United States)

^c TEXAS CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77956935661     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhq060     Document Type: Article

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