Capital budgeting and managerial compensation: Incentive and retention effects

Accounting Review

Volumn 78, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 71-93

  Dutta, Sunil ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Capita investments; Managerial incentives; Managerial retention; Stock options

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037289528     PISSN: 00014826     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2308/accr.2003.78.1.71     Document Type: Review

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