The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels

Journal of Accounting and Economics

Volumn 28, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 151-184

  Core, John ^a   Guay, Wayne ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Contracting; Equity incentives; G32; J33; J41; M4; Managerial compensation; Managerial ownership; Stock options

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001245231     PISSN: 01654101     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4101(99)00019-1     Document Type: Article

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