Public opinion and executive compensation

Management Science

Volumn 58, Issue 7, 2012, Pages 1249-1272

  Kuhnen, Camelia M ^a   Niessen, Alexandra ^b  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

Author keywords

Executive compensation; Media coverage; Public opinion

Indexed keywords

ANNUAL CHANGE; CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER; EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION; MEAN REVERSION; MEDIA COVERAGE; NEGATIVE PRESS; PUBLIC OPINIONS; STOCK MARKET; STOCK OPTIONS;

PRESSES (MACHINE TOOLS); WAGES;

INDUSTRY;

EID: 84864074446     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1110.1490     Document Type: Article

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