Empirical tests of budget ratcheting and its effect on managers' discretionary accrual choices

Journal of Accounting and Economics

Volumn 33, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 43-67

  Leone, Andrew J ^a   Rock, Steve ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO   (United States)

Author keywords

Bonus plans; Earnings management; Performance budgets; Ratchet effect; Ratchet principle

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036183802     PISSN: 01654101     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4101(01)00044-1     Document Type: Article

References (19)

1. The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings
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3. Executive incentives and the horizon problem
4. Smoothing income in anticipation of future earnings
5. Additional evidence on bonus plans and income management
6. Earnings-based bonus plans and earnings management by business unit managers
7. The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions
8. Annual bonus schemes and the manipulation of earnings
9. Earnings management during import relief investigations
10. Participative budgets as coordination and motivational devices
11. Performance matched discretionary accrual measures
12. The achievability of budget targets in profit centers: A field study
13. Executive compensation
14. Performance standards in incentive contracts
15. Financial performance surrounding CEO turnover
16. Factor analysis of behavioral variables affecting budgetary slack
17. Earnings management and nonroutine executive changes
18. The impact of people on budgets
19. The "ratchet principle" and performance incentives