Performance-vested stock options and interest alignment

British Accounting Review

Volumn 41, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 46-61

  Kuang, Yu Flora ^a   Qin, Bo ^b  

^a VU UNIVERSITY AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Equity incentive; Pay performance sensitivity; Stock options

Indexed keywords

EID: 61649110217     PISSN: 08908389     EISSN: 10958347     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.bar.2008.10.001     Document Type: Article

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