The pricing of relative performance based incentives for executive compensation

Journal of Business Finance and Accounting

Volumn 28, Issue 9-10, 2001, Pages 1115-1139

  Câmara, Antońio ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF STRATHCLYDE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 56649084607     PISSN: 0306686X     EISSN: 14685957     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-5957.00410     Document Type: Conference Paper

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