Economic reasoning and artificial intelligence

Science

Volumn 349, Issue 6245, 2015, Pages 267-272

  Parkes, David C ^a   Wellman, Michael P ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; DESIGN; ECONOMIC ANALYSIS; ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY; INCENTIVE; NEOCLASSICAL THEORY;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; ECONOMIC ASPECT; ECONOMICS; FEEDBACK SYSTEM; GAME; HUMAN; MACHINE LEARNING; POLICY; PRIORITY JOURNAL; RESEARCH; REVIEW; SCIENTIST; SOCIOLOGY; UNITED STATES; BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS; THINKING;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; ECONOMICS, BEHAVIORAL; HUMANS; THINKING;

EID: 84937786173     PISSN: 00368075     EISSN: 10959203     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1126/science.aaa8403     Document Type: Review

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