Finding equilibria in large sequential games of imperfect information

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn 2006, Issue , 2006, Pages 160-169

  Gilpin, Andrew ^a   Sandholm, Tuomas ^a  

^a Carnegie Mellon University ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

Automated abstraction; Computer poker; Equilibrium finding; Game theory; Sequential games of imperfect information

Indexed keywords

ABSTRACTING; ALGORITHMS; APPROXIMATION THEORY; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; GAME THEORY; MATHEMATICAL TRANSFORMATIONS;

AUTOMATED ABSTRACTIONS; COMPUTER POKERS; EQUILIBRIUM FINDING; SEQUENTIAL GAMES OF IMPERFECT INFORMATIONS;

PROBLEM SOLVING;

EID: 33748800293     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1134707.1134725     Document Type: Conference Paper

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