Incentive compatible regression learning

Journal of Computer and System Sciences

Volumn 76, Issue 8, 2010, Pages 759-777

  Dekel, Ofer ^a   Fischer, Felix ^b   Procaccia, Ariel D ^b  

^a MICROSOFT RESEARCH   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Algorithmic mechanism design; Computational learning theory; Regression analysis

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY; MACHINE DESIGN; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; REGRESSION ANALYSIS;

ALGORITHMIC MECHANISM DESIGN; COMPUTATIONAL LEARNING THEORY; ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY; GAME-THEORETIC; INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE; LEARNING SETTINGS; MULTIPLE AGENTS; PRIVATE INFORMATION;

COMPUTATION THEORY;

EID: 77954728363     PISSN: 00220000     EISSN: 10902724     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcss.2010.03.003     Document Type: Article

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