Strong mediated equilibrium

Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 173, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 180-195

  Monderer, Dov ^a   Tennenholtz, Moshe ^a  

^a TECHNION ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Israel)

Author keywords

Game theory; Mediated equilibrium; Mediator; Multi agent systems; Strong equilibrium

Indexed keywords

AGENTS; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; SYSTEM STABILITY;

DESIGN AND ANALYSES; MEDIATED EQUILIBRIUM; MEDIATOR; STRONG EQUILIBRIUM;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 56249134514     PISSN: 00043702     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2008.10.005     Document Type: Article

References (36)

1. I. Abraham, D. Dolev, R. Gonen, J. Halpern, Distributed computing meets game theory: Robust mechanisms for rational secret sharing and multiparty computation, in: Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, 2006, pp. 53-62
2. H. Ackermann, P. Goldberg, V. Mirrokni, H. Röglin, B. Vöcking, A unified approach to congestion games and two-sided markets, in: Proceedings of WINE-07, 2007, pp. 30-41
3. I. Ashlagi, D. Monderer, M. Tennenholtz, Mediators in position auctions, in: The ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC-2007, 2007
4. R. Aumann, Acceptable points in general cooperative n-person games, in: A. Tucker, R. Luce (Eds.), Contribution to the Theory of Games, vol. IV, Annals of Mathematics Studies, vol. 40, 1959, pp. 287-324
5. R. Aumann, The core of cooperative games without payments, in: Transactions of the American Mathematical Society, 1961
6. Aumann R. Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies. Journal of Mathematical Economics 1 (1974) 67-96
7. N. Bhat, K. Leyton-Brown, Y. Shoham, M. Tennenholtz, Bidding Rings Revisited
8. Bondareva O. Some applications of linear programming methods to the theory of cooperative games. Problemi Kibernet 10 (1963) 119-139 (in Russian)
9. Boutilier C., Shoham Y., and Wellman M. Special issue on economic principles of multi-agent systems. Artificial Intelligence 94 (1997)
10. Cramton P., Shoham Y., and Steinberg R. Combinatorial Auctions (2006), MIT Press
11. Forges F.M. An approach to communication equilibria. Econometrica 54 6 (1986) 1375-1385
12. Graham D., and Marshall R. Collusive bidder behavior at single-object second-price and English auctions. Journal of Political Economy 95 (1987) 579-599
13. Holzman R., and Law-Yone N. Strong equilibrium in congestion games. Games and Economic Behavior 21 (1997) 85-101
14. S. Kakade, M. Kearns, J. Langford, L. Ortiz, Correlated equilibria in graphical games, in: ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2003, pp. 42-47
15. Kalai E., and Rosenthal R. Arbitration of two-party disputes under ignorance. International Journal of Game Theory 7 (1976) 65-72
16. E. Koutsoupias, C. Papadimitriou, Worst-case equilibria, in: STACS, 1999
17. Linial N. Game-theoretic aspects of computer science. In: Aumann R., and Hart S. (Eds). Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, vol. II (1994), North-Holland 1340-1395 Chapter 38
18. McAfee R., and McMillan J. Bidding rings. The American Economic Theory 82 (1992) 579-599
19. Monderer D., and Tennenholtz M. K-implementation. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR) 21 (2004) 37-62
20. Moses Y., and Tennenholtz M. Artificial social systems. Computers and Artificial Intelligence 14 6 (1995) 533-562
21. Myerson R.B. Multistage games with communication. Econometrica 54 2 (1986) 323-358
22. Nisan N., Roughgarden T., Tardos E., and Vazirani V. Algorithmic Game Theory (2007), Cambridge University Press
23. C. Papadimitriou, Computing correlated equilibria in multi-player games, in: Proceedings of the Thirty-Seventh Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2005, pp. 49-56
24. D.C. Parkes, Computational mechanism design, in: Lecture Notes of Tutorials at 10th Conf. on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK-05), Institute of Mathematical Sciences, University of Singapore
25. Rosenschein J.S., and Zlotkin G. Rules of Encounter (1994), MIT Press
26. Roughgarden T., and Tardos E. How bad in selfish routing?. Journal of the ACM 49 2 (2002) 236-259
27. O. Rozenfeld, M. Tennenholtz, Routing mediators, in: Proceedings of the 23rd International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-07), 2007
28. T. Sandholm, Making markets and democracy work: A story of incentives and computing, in: Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-03), 2003, pp. 1649-1671
29. Shapley L.S. On balanced sets and cores. Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 14 (1967) 453-460
30. Shoham Y., and Tennenholtz M. Social laws for artificial agent societies: Off-line design. Artificial Intelligence 73 (1995)
31. A. Tauman-Kalai, E. Kalai, E. Lehrer, D. Samet, A commitment folk theorem, Working Paper. Northwestern University, 2007
32. Tennenholtz M. Program equilibrium. Games and Economic Behavior 49 (2004) 363-373
33. Varian H. Position auctions. International Journal of Industrial Organization 25 (2007) 1163-1178
34. von Neumann J., and Morgenstern O. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944), Princeton University Press, Princeton
35. von Neumann J. First draft of a report on the edvac, contract no. w-670-ord-402 moore school of electrical engineering, Univ. of Penn., Philadelphia, 1945. Reprinted (in part). In: Randell B. (Ed). Origins of Digital Computers: Selected Papers (1982), Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg 383-392
36. Zhao J. A β-core existence result and its application to oligopoly markets. Games and Economic Behavior 27 (1999) 153-168