Networks of influence diagrams: A formalism for representing agents' beliefs and decision-making processes

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research

Volumn 33, Issue , 2008, Pages 109-147

  Gal, Ya'akov ^a   Pfeffer, Avi ^b  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH; COGNITIVE SYSTEMS;

BELIEF STRUCTURES; BOUNDED RATIONALITY; COMPUTATIONAL AGENTS; DECISION MAKING PROCESS; GRAPHICAL STRUCTURES; INFLUENCE DIAGRAM; OPPONENT MODELING; OPTIMAL STRATEGIES;

DECISION MAKING;

EID: 55349100559     PISSN: None     EISSN: 10769757     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1613/jair.2503     Document Type: Article

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