Bayesian optimal auctions via multi- to single-agent reduction

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 17-

  Alaei, Saeed ^a   Fu, Hu ^b   Haghpanah, Nima ^c   Hartline, Jason ^c   Malekian, Azarakhsh ^d  

^a Institute of Advanced Computer Science   (United States)

^b School of Operations Research and Information Engineering   (United States)

^c Northwestern University   (United States)

^d Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science   (United States)

Author keywords

border's constraints; optimal mechanism design

Indexed keywords

ALLOCATION RULE; BORDER'S CONSTRAINTS; FEASIBILITY PROBLEM; INDEPENDENT SET; INDIVIDUAL AGENT; LINEAR PROGRAMS; MULTI-AGENT MECHANISM; MULTI-ITEM; OPTIMAL AUCTION; OPTIMAL MECHANISM; POLYMATROIDS; POLYNOMIAL-TIME; POLYTOPES; QUADRATIC COMPLEXITY; SELF-INTERESTED AGENTS; SINGLE-AGENT;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; MACHINE DESIGN; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION; PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS;

OPTIMIZATION;

EID: 84863520790     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/2229012.2229017     Document Type: Conference Paper

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