Engineering trust: Reciprocity in the production of reputation information

Management Science

Volumn 59, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 265-285

  Bolton, Gary ^a,b   Greiner, Ben ^c   Ockenfels, Axel ^d  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES   (Australia)

^d UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE   (Germany)

Author keywords

EBay; Market design; Reciprocity; Reputation; Trust

Indexed keywords

EBAY; MARKET DESIGN; RECIPROCITY; REPUTATION; TRUST;

MANAGEMENT; MANAGEMENT SCIENCE;

COMMERCE;

EID: 84874131969     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1120.1609     Document Type: Article

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