Understanding incentives: Mechanism design becomes algorithm design

Proceedings - Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS

Volumn , Issue , 2013, Pages 618-627

  Cai, Yang ^a   Daskalakis, Constantinos ^a   Matthew Weinberg, S ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHM DESIGN; APPROXIMATION-PRESERVING REDUCTIONS; BLACK-BOX REDUCTIONS; COMPUTATIONALLY EFFICIENT; MAX-MIN FAIRNESS; MECHANISM DESIGN; POLYNOMIAL FACTOR; TRUTHFUL MECHANISMS;

COMPUTER SCIENCE;

MACHINE DESIGN;

EID: 84893501912     PISSN: 02725428     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/FOCS.2013.72     Document Type: Conference Paper

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