Improving resource allocation strategies against human adversaries in security games: An extended study

Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 195, Issue , 2013, Pages 440-469

  Yang, Rong ^a   Kiekintveld, Christopher ^b   Ordóñez, Fernando ^a,c   Tambe, Milind ^a   John, Richard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT EL PASO   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CHILE   (Chile)

Author keywords

Bounded rationality; Decision making; Stackelberg games

Indexed keywords

BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH; DECISION MAKING; DECISION THEORY; GAME THEORY; STOCHASTIC SYSTEMS;

BOUNDED RATIONALITY; DISCRETE CHOICE MODELS; FUNDAMENTAL THEORY; HUMAN DECISION MAKING; NEW MATHEMATICAL MODEL; RANK-DEPENDENT EXPECTED UTILITY THEORIES; RESOURCE ALLOCATION STRATEGIES; STACKELBERG GAMES;

STOCHASTIC MODELS;

EID: 84884909909     PISSN: 00043702     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2012.11.004     Document Type: Article

References (48)

1. R. Yang, C. Kiekintveld, F. Ordonez, M. Tambe, R. John, Improving resource allocation strategy against human adversaries in security games, in: IJCAI, 2011, pp. 458-464.
2. N. Gatti, Game theoretical insights in strategic patrolling: Model and algorithm in normal-form, in: ECAI-08, 2008, pp. 403-407.
3. N. Agmon, S. Kraus, G.A. Kaminka, Multi-robot perimeter patrol in adversarial settings, in: ICAT, 2008, pp. 2339-2345.
4. N. Basiloco, N. Gatti, F. Amigoni, Leader-follower strategies for robotic patrolling in environments with arbitrary topologies, in: AAMAS, 2009, pp. 57-64.
5. J. Pita, M. Jain, F. Ordonez, C. Portway, M. Tambe, C. Western, P. Paruchuri, S. Kraus, Deployed armor protection: The application of a game theoretic model for security at the Los Angeles international airport, in: AAMAS, 2008, pp. 125-132.
6. J. Tsai, S. Rathi, C. Kiekintveld, F. Ordonez, M. Tambe, IRIS - a tool for strategic security allocation in transportation networks, in: AAMAS, 2009, pp. 37-44.
7. J. Pita, M. Tambe, C. Kiekintveld, S. Cullen, E. Steigerwald, GUARDS - game theoretic security allocation on a national scale, in: AAMAS, 2011, pp. 37-44.
8. B. An, J. Pita, E. Shieh, M. Tambe, C. Kiekintveld, J. Marecki, GUARDS and PROTECT: Next generation applications of security games, ACM SIGecom Exchanges 10 (2011) 31-34.
9. C.F. Camerer, T. Ho, J. Chongn, A cognitive hierarchy model of games, QJE 119 (2004) 861-898. (Pubitemid 39057309)
10. M. Costa-Gomes, V.P. Crawford, B. Broseta, Cognition and behavior in normal-form games: An experimental study, Econometrica 69 (2001) 1193-1235. (Pubitemid 33723037)
11. S. Ficici, A. Pfeffer, Simultaneously modeling humans' preferences and their beliefs about others' preferences, in: AAMAS, 2008, pp. 323-330.
12. Y. Gal, A. Pfeffer, Modeling reciprocal behavior in human bilateral negotiation, in: AAAI, 2007
13. M. Tambe, Security and Game Theory: Algorithms, Deployed Systems, Lessons Learned, Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 2011.
14. D. Korzhyk, V. Conitzer, R. Parr, Security games with multiple attacker resources, in: IJCAI, 2011, pp. 273-279.
15. J. Letchford, Y. Vorobeychik, Computing randomized security strategies in networked domains, in: AARM Workshop in AAAI, 2011.
16. D. Kahneman, A. Tvesky, Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk, Econometrica 47 (1979) 263-292.
17. R.D. McKelvey, T.R. Palfrey, Quantal response equilibria for normal form games, Games and Economic Behavior 2 (1995) 6-38.
18. P. Paruchuri, J.P. Pearce, J. Marecki, M. Tambe, F. Ordonez, S. Kraus, Playing games for security: An efficient exact algorithm for solving bayesian Stackelberg games, in: AAMAS, 2008, pp. 895-902.
19. C. Kiekintveld, M. Jain, J. Tsai, J. Pita, F. Ordonez, M. Tambe, Computing optimal randomized resource allocations for massive security games, in: AAMAS, 2009, pp. 689-696.
20. J. Pita, M. Jain, F. Ordonez, M. Tambe, S. Kraus, Solving Stackelberg games in the real-world: Addressing bounded rationality and limited observations in human preference models, Artificial Intelligence Journal 174 (2010) 1142-1171.
21. C. Fox, R. Clemen, Subjective probability assessment in decision analysis: Partition dependence and bias toward the ignorance prior, Management Science 51 (2005) 1417-1432. (Pubitemid 41394246)
22. K.E. See, C.R. Fox, Y.S. Rottenstreich, Between ignorance and truth: Partition dependence and learning in judgment under uncertainty, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 32 (2006) 1385-1402. (Pubitemid 44706777)
23. D.L. McFadden, Econometric analysis of qualitative response models, in: Z. Griliches, M.D. Intriligator (Eds.), Handbook of Econometrics, vol. 2, Elsevier, 1984, pp. 1395-1457.
24. K. Train, Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2003.
25. D.L. McFadden, Quantal choice analysis: A survey, Annals of Economic and Social Measurement 5 (1976) 369-390.
26. D.L. McFadden, A method of simulated moments for estimation of discrete choice models without numerical integration, Econometrica 57 (1989) 995-1026.
27. E. Diecidue, P.P. Wakker, On the intuition of rank-dependent utility, The Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 23 (2001) 281-289.
28. D. Korzhyk, Z. Yin, C. Kiekintveld, V. Conitzer, M. Tambe, Stackelberg vs. Nash in security games: An extended investigation of interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness, in: JAIR, 2011, pp. 297-327.
29. D. Korzhyk, V. Conitzer, R. Parr, Complexity of computing optimal Stackelberg strategies in security resource allocation games, in: AAAI, 2010.
30. J. Tsai, Z. Yin, J. Kwak, D. Kempe, C. Kiekintveld, M. Tambe, Urban security: Game-theoretic resource allocation in networked physical domains, in: AAAI, 2010.
31. D. Kahneman, A. Tvesky, Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5 (1992) 297-322.
32. D.O. Stahl, P.W. Wilson, Experimental evidence on players' models of other players, JEBO 25 (1994) 309-327.
33. J.R. Wright, K. Leyton-Brown, Beyond equilibrium: Predicting human behavior in normal-form games, in: AAAI, 2010.
34. H. Simon, Rational choice and the structure of the environment, Psychological Review 63 (1956) 129-138.
35. M.K. Sen, P.L. Stoffa, Global Optimization Methods in Geophysical Inversion, Elsevier, New York, 1995.
36. J.C. Becsey, L. Berke, J.R. Callan, Nonlinear least squares methods: A direct grid search approach, Journal of Chemical Education 45 (1968) 728.
37. R.R. Wilcox, Applying Contemporary Statistical Techniques, Academic Press, 2003.
38. N. Feltovich, Reinforment-based vs. belief-based learning models in experimental asymmetric-information games, Econometrica 68 (2000) 605-641.
39. N. Agmon, S. Kraus, G.A. Kaminka, V. Sadow, Adversarial uncertainty in multi-robot patrol, in: IJCAI, 2009, pp. 1811-1817.
40. N. Gatti, Game theoretical insights in strategic patrolling model and algorithm in normal-form, in: ECAI, 2008, pp. 403-407.
41. M. Aghassi, D. Bertsimas, Robust game theory, Mathematical Programming 107 (2006) 231-273. (Pubitemid 43334021)
42. Z. Yin, M. Jain, M. Tambe, F. Ordonez, Risk-averse strategies for security games with execution and observational uncertainty, in: AAAI, 2011.
43. C. Kiekintveld, J. Marecki, M. Tambe, Approximation methods for infinite bayesian Stackelberg games: Modeling distributional payoff uncertainty, in: AAMAS, 2011, pp. 1005-1012.
44. R. Hastie, R.M. Dawes, Rational Choice in an Uncertain World: the Psychology of Judgement and Decision Making, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, 2001.
45. C. Starmer, Developments in non-expected utility theory: The hunt for a descriptive theory of choice under risk, Journal of Economic Literature XXXVIII (2000) 332-382.
46. C. de Melo, P. Carnevale, J. Gratch, The effect of expression of anger and happiness in computer agents on negotiations with humans, in: AAMAS, 2011, pp. 937-944.
47. A. Azaria, Z. Rabinovich, S. Kraus, C.V. Goldman, Strategic information disclosure to people with multiple alternatives, in: AAAI, 2011, pp. 594-600.
48. N. Peled, Y. Gal, S. Kraus, A study of computational and human strategies in revelation games, in: AAMAS, 2011, pp. 345-352.