Peer prediction without a common prior

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 964-981

  Witkowski, Jens ^a   Parkes, David C ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FREIBURG   (Germany)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

information elicitation; mechanism design; peer prediction

Indexed keywords

CROWDSOURCING; INFORMATION ELICITATION; MECHANICAL TURKS; MECHANISM DESIGN; ON-LINE OPINIONS; POSITIVE SIGNALS; PREDICTION METHODS; REPUTATION MECHANISM; TECHNICAL REQUIREMENT; TEMPORAL STRUCTURES;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; MACHINE DESIGN;

FORECASTING;

EID: 84863506647     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/2229012.2229085     Document Type: Conference Paper

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