The economic psychology of tax behaviour

The Economic Psychology of Tax Behaviour

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 1-243

  Kirchler, Erich ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

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EID: 84928767267     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511628238     Document Type: Book

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