Tax evasion and income source: A comparative experimental study

Journal of Economic Psychology

Volumn 27, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 402-422

  Gërxhani, Klarita ^a   Schram, Arthur ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Comparative analysis; Experiment; Institutions; Tax evasion; Transition

Indexed keywords

EID: 33747893735     PISSN: 01674870     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2005.08.002     Document Type: Article

References (66)

1. Allingham M.G., and Sandmo A. Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis. Journal of Public Economics 1 (1972) 323-338
2. Alm J. A perspective on the experimental analysis of taxpayer reporting. Accounting Review 66/3 (1991) 577-593
3. Alm J., Jackson B.R., and McKee M. Estimating the determinants of taxpayer compliance with experimental data. National Tax Journal 45 (1992) 107-114
4. Alm J., McClelland G.H., and Schulze W.D. Why do people pay taxes?. Journal of Public Economics 48 (1992) 21-38
5. Alm J., McClelland G.H., and Schulze W.D. Changing the social norm of tax compliance by voting. Kyklos 52/2 (1999) 141-171
6. Alm J., Sanchez I., and De Juan A. Economic and noneconomic factors in tax compliance. Kyklos 48/1 (1995) 3-18
7. Alm, J., & Torgler, B. (2004). Culture Differences and Tax Morale in the United States and in Europe. CREMA Working Paper 2004-14, Basel, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts.
8. Andreoni J., Erard B., and Feinstein J. Tax compliance. Journal of Economic Literature 36 (1998) 818-860
9. Baldry J.C. Tax evasion is not a gamble: a report on two experiments. Economics Letters 22 (1986) 333-335
10. Bayer, R. C., & Sutter, M. (2003). The Excess Burden of Tax Evasion-An Experimental Detection-Concealment Contest. Mimeo, University of Innsbruck.
11. Becker W., Buchner H.-J., and Sleeking S. The impact of public transfer expenditures on tax evasion: an experimental approach. Journal of Public Economics 34 (1987) 243-252
12. Boeschoten W.C., and Fase M.M.G. The volume of payments and the informal economy in the Netherlands, 1965-1982 (1984), M. Nijhoff, Dordrecht
13. Bolton G., and Ockenfels A. ERC: a theory of equity, reciprocity and competition. American Economic Review 90 1 (2000) 166-193
14. Brandts J., Saijo T., and Schram A. How universal is behavior? A four country comparison of spite, cooperation and errors in voluntary contribution mechanisms. Public Choice 119 (2004) 381-424
15. Charness G., and Rabin M. Understanding social preferences with simple tests. Quarterly Journal of Economics 117 (2002) 817-869
16. Collins J.H., and Plumlee R.D. The taxpayer's labor and reporting decision: the effect of audit schemes?. Accounting Review 66/3 (1991) 559-576
17. Cowell F. Cheating the government (1990), MIT Press, Cambridge
18. Cowell F.A., and Gordon J.P.F. Unwillingness to pay. Journal of Public Economics 36 (1988) 305-321
19. Cummings, R. G., Martinez-Vazquez, J., McKee, M., & Torgler, B. (2004). Effects of culture on tax compliance: a cross check of experimental and survey evidence. In Paper presented at the Meeting of the Public Choice Society, Baltimore, March 11-14, 2004.
20. Elffers H., Robben H.S.J., and Hessing D.J. On measuring tax evasion. Journal of Economic Psychology 13 (1992) 545-567
21. Elster J. Social norms and economic theory. Journal of Economic Perspectives 3 (1989) 99-117
22. Feige E.L. The underground economies: Tax evasion and information distortion (1989), Cambridge University Press
23. Feige E.L. Underground activity and institutional change: productive, protective and predatory behavior in transition economies. In: Nelson J.M., Tilley C., and Walker L. (Eds). Transforming Post-communist Political Economies (1997), National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. 21-35
24. Feld L.P., and Frey B.S. Trust breeds trust: how taxpayers are treated. Economics of Governance 3 (2002) 87-99
25. Feld L.P., and Tyran J. Tax evasion and voting: an experimental analysis. Kyklos 55 2 (2002) 197-222
26. Frey B.S., and Weck H. Bureaucracy and the shadow economy: a macro approach. In: Hanusch H. (Ed). Anatomy of Government Deficiency (1981), Wayne State University Press, Detroit
27. Friedland N., Maital S., and Rutenberg A. A simulation study of income tax evasion. Journal of Public Economics 10 (1978) 107-116
28. Giese, S., & Hoffman, G. (1999). Tax evasion and risky investments in an intertemporal context-an experimental study. Discussion paper 153, Humboldt University.
29. Gërxhani, K. (2002). The Informal Sector in Transition: Tax Evasion in an Institutional Vacuum, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Amsterdam. Tinbergen Institute Research Series, no. 265. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam.
30. Gërxhani K. Tax evasion in transition: outcome of an institutional clash? Testing Feige's conjecture in Albania. European Economic Review 48 4 (2004) 729-745
31. Gërxhani K. The informal sector in developed and less developed countries: a literature survey. Public Choice 120 3-4 (2004) 267-300
32. Güth, W., Levati, V. M., & Sausgruber, R. (in press). Tax morale and (de-)centralization-an experimental study. Public Choice.
33. Heinrich J., Boyd R., Bowles S., Camerer C., Fehr E., Gintis H., et al. In search of homo economicus: behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies. American Economic Review 91 (2001) 73-78
34. Isaac R.M., Walker J., and Thomas S. Divergent evidence on free riding: an experimental examination of possible explanations. Public Choice 43 (1984) 113-149
35. Johnson S., Kaufmann D., and Zoido-Lobaton P. Regulatory discretion and the unofficial economy. American Economic Review 88/2 (1998) 387-392
36. Kazemier B., and van Eck R. Survey investigations of the hidden economy. Some methodological results. Journal of Economic Psychology 13 (1992) 569-587
37. Kim C.K. Does fairness matter in tax reporting behavior?. Journal of Economic Psychology 23 (2002) 771-785
38. Kirchler E., and Maciejovsky B. Tax compliance within the context of gain and loss situations, expected and current asset position, and profession. Journal of Economic Psychology 22 (2001) 173-194
39. Kolm S.C. A note on optimum tax evasion. Journal of Public Economics 2 (1973) 265-270
40. Maddala G. Limited-dependent and qualitative variables in econometrics (1983), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
41. Martinez-Vazquez J., and McNab R.M. The tax reform experiment in transitional countries. National Tax Journal 53/2 (2000) 273-298
42. Naylor R. Strikes, free riders, and social consensus. Quarterly Journal of Economics 104 (1989) 771-786
43. North D.C. Institutions, institutional change and economic performance (1990), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
44. Pestieau P., and Possen U. Tax evasion and occupational choice. Journal of Public Economics 45 (1991) 107-125
45. Pommerehne, W., Hart, A., & Frey, B. S. (1994). Tax Morale, Tax Evasion, and the Choice of Tax Policy Instruments in Different Political Systems. Supplement to Public Finance/Finances Publiques, 49, pp. 52-69.
46. Robben H.S.J. A behavioral simulation and documented behavior approach to income tax evasion (1991), Kluwer, Deventer
47. Robben H.S.J., Webley P., Elffers H., and Hessing D.J. Decision frames, opportunity and tax evasion. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 14 (1990) 353-361
48. Roth A.E., Prasnikar V., Okuwo-Fujiwara M., and Zamir S. Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubiljana, Pittsburgh and Tokyo: an experimental study. American Economic Review 81 (1991) 1068-1095
49. Saijo T., and Nakamura H. The 'spite' dilemma in voluntary contribution mechanism experiments. Journal of Conflict Resolution 39 (1995) 535-560
50. Schneider, F. (2002). 'The size and development of the shadow economies of 22 transition and 21 OECD countries.' IZA Discussion paper no. 514, Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn.
51. Schneider, F. (in press). Shadow economies around the world. What do we really know? European Journal of Political Economy.
52. Schneider F., and Enste D.H. Shadow economies: size, causes and consequences. Journal of Economic Literature 38/1 (2000) 77-114
53. Schneider F., and Enste D.H. The shadow economy: An international survey (2003), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
54. Schneider F., and Neck R. The development of the shadow economy under changing tax systems and structures. Finanzarchiv N.F. 50 3 (1993) 344-369
55. Schram A. Testing economic theories of voter behaviour using micro-data. Applied Economics 24 (1992) 419-428
56. Schram A. Sorting out the seeking: the economics of individual motivations. Public Choice 103 (2000) 231-258
57. Schram A. Artificiality: the tension between internal and external validity in economic experiments. Journal of Economic Methodology 12 2 (2005) 225-237
58. Slemrod J., and Bakija J. Taxing ourselves: A citizen's guide to the great debate over tax reform (2000), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
59. Tanzi V. The underground economy in the United States and abroad (1982), D.C. Heath and Co., Lexington, Massachusetts, Toronto
60. Torgler B. Tax morale in transition countries. Post-Communist Economies 15 3 (2003) 357-381
61. Torgler B. Does culture matter? Tax morale in an East-West-German comparison. FinanzArchiv 59 (2003) 504-528
62. Torgler B. Cross-culture comparison of tax morale and tax compliance: evidence from Costa Rica and Switzerland. International Journal of Comparative Sociology 45/1-2 (2004) 17-43
63. Torgler, B., & Schaltegger, C. A. (2003). Tax Amnesty and Political Participation. WWZ-Discussion Paper 03/07, Basel: WWZ.
64. Torgler, B., & Schneider, F. (2004). Does Culture Influence Tax Morale? Evidence from Different European Countries. Unpublished paper.
65. Webley P., Robben H., Elffers H., and Hessing D. Tax evasion: An experimental approach (1991), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
66. Yitzhaki S. Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis. Journal of Public Economics 3 (1974) 201-202