Explaining altruistic behavior in humans

Evolution and Human Behavior

Volumn 24, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 153-172

  Gintis, Herbert ^a,b   Bowles, Samuel ^a,b   Boyd, Robert ^c   Fehr, Ernst ^d  

^a SANTA FE INSTITUTE   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Altruism; Evolution of cooperation; Experimental games; Reciprocity

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038669290     PISSN: 10905138     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S1090-5138(02)00157-5     Document Type: Article

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