Revenge, tax informing, and the optimal bounty

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 3, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 225-233

  Yaniv, Gideon ^a,b  

^a National Insurance Institute of Israel   (Israel)

^b College of Management ^*  (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 17844395637     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1097-3923.00064     Document Type: Article

References (7)

1. ANDREONI, J., B. ERARD, and J. FEINSTEIN (1998) Tax compliance, Journal of Economic Literature 36, 818-860.
2. COWELL, F. (1990) Cheating the Government: The Economics of Evasion. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
3. ELSTER, J. (1998) Emotions and economic theory, Journal of Economic Literature 36, 47-74.
4. FREY, B. S. (1997) Not Just for the Money: An Economic Theory of Personal Motivation. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
5. NOVACK, J. (1997) Boomerang! Forbes Magazine, July 7, 42-43.
6. SCHNEPPER, J. A. (1998) How to Pay Zero Taxes. New York: McGraw-Hill.
7. VOGEL, R. L. (1995) Whistleblowers, bounties, and health care fraud, http: www.fraudbuster.com.