Tax morale in Latin America

Public Choice

Volumn 122, Issue 1-2, 2005, Pages 133-157

  Torgler, Benno ^a,b,c  

^a GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BASEL   (Switzerland)

^c CREMA CENTER FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 23644435942     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-5790-4     Document Type: Article

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