Reciprocity and economics: The economic implications of Homo Reciprocans

European Economic Review

Volumn 42, Issue 3-5, 1998, Pages 845-859

  Fehr, Ernst ^a   Gächter, Simon ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Fairness; Involuntary unemployment; Norm enforcement; Reciprocity; Social norms; Wage differentials; Wage rigidity

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645122335     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(97)00131-1     Document Type: Article

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