Deterrence and tax morale in the European Union

European Review

Volumn 11, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 385-406

  Frey, Bruno S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EUROPEAN UNION; FINANCIAL SYSTEM; TAX SYSTEM;

EUROPE;

EID: 0041328212     PISSN: 10627987     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1062798703000346     Document Type: Article

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